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The main objectives of this article is to gauge to what extent metropolitan 
governments have led to the improvement of service delivery and to investigate 
how the existing governing and institutional frameworks are working for metros. 
Evidence suggests that the creation of widely drawn single-tier municipalities 
encompassing the whole city is a better governing model than the two-tier system. 
It has also led to the embodiment of the one city, one tax base slogan. It has also 
contributed to improved service delivery although there are still backlogs due to in-
migration. There is evidence to suggest ordinary councillors are not communicating 
effectively with their constituencies. Part of the problem is that they do not have 
delegated powers and functions, even though they have constituencies to which they 
are accountable. The local government electoral system of 50% ward councillors 
and 50% proportional representation (PR) councillors has led in some cases to 
bloated councils with a number of PR councillors contributing little to the governing 
function. While there are some ward committees that are functioning, the evidence 
suggests that the majority of these structures are not working particularly well. They 
are too politicised and do not appear to promote public participation. Literature 
suggests that there is limited public participation in integrated development 
plans. Community Development Workers do bring some benefi ts to metropolitan 
municipalities and support councillors in some instances. However, there is some 
concern about their relationship with elected councillors and the implications for 
democratic accountability.
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INTRODUCTION
The new constitutional framework vested the South African local government with a great 
deal of decentralisation. Local government has substantial autonomy to govern its affairs. 
However it has not led to the desired outcomes. A 2009 report from COGTA (Department 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 2009) highlighted the general poor 
performance of local government.
As a result of this report, a turn around strategy for local government was put in place. 
COGTA’s report was on all 283 (now 278) a municipality in the country and much of it is about 
the inability of smaller municipalities to perform their functions and conform to rigorous reporting 
criteria. Can the results to be generalised to the six metropolitan municipalities (since the 2011 
municipal elections, eight) (hereafter metros)? The report does admit that it could paint a rather 
skewed picture of local government, wherein the challenges of the majority of municipalities 
overshadow the more positive impact that those few municipalities that are well capacitated and 
effective could be having on the larger proportion of the population (COGTA 2009:34).
The report (COGTA 2009:22) does recognise the special status of metropolitan 
government. It states that metros (and the secondary cities) are well established and 
consolidated, but they face sustainability challenges due to urbanisation and in-migration 
that is accompanied by high levels of household poverty. However, the report does not go 
into major detail on how to improve the status of metropolitan government. This article 
aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the metropolitan government system. 
There is a concern that the development of the country’s local government system has 
not suffi ciently appreciated the uniqueness of metros. The main objectives are: to gauge 
what extent metropolitan governments have led to the improvement of service delivery; to 
investigate how the existing governance and institutional frameworks are working for metros.
The article is an analysis of metros in the second term of democratic local government 
(2006 until the 2011 local government elections).
METHODOLOGY
The following methodological sources were used:
Data bases on metropolitan government were consulted. This included data from Stats 
SA, Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB), Treasury, COGTA and individual municipalities.
A literature review included perusing information from both offi cial national, provincial 
and local government documents, as well as from secondary resources such as academic 
and consultants’ reports.
20 interviews were conducted with:
 ● senior offi cials from the provincial governments of Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and the 
Western Cape;
 ● senior offi cials from the eThekwini, Johannesburg, Tshwane, Nelson Mandela and 
Cape Town municipalities;
 ● senior offi cials from the Treasury;
 ● a representative from SALGA;
 ● the former chairperson of South African Cities Network;
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 ● an offi cial from the Gauteng City Region Observatory; and
 ● local government consultants.
DEVELOPMENT OF METROPOLITAN 
GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
In terms of interim phase of government (1994/5-2000), two-tier metropolitan governments 
were created in the Western Cape, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. In the Western 
Cape the Cape Metropolitan Council was established. Gauteng had four metropolitan 
councils namely Greater Johannesburg, Greater Pretoria, Khayalami and Lekoa Vaal. Greater 
Durban metro was created in KwaZulu-Natal (Cameron 1999).
Unlike the interim Constitution, the fi nal Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 did not make provision for separate categories of metropolitan, urban and rural local 
government. Section 155(1) of the fi nal Constitution makes provision for category A, B and C 
municipalities. The defi nitions are:
 ● Category A: A municipality that has exclusive municipal, executive and legislative 
authority in its area.
 ● Category B: A municipality that shares municipal, executive and legislative authority, 
in its area, with a Category C municipality within whose area it falls.
 ● Category C: A municipality that has municipal, executive and legislative authority in 
an area that includes more than one municipality.
The new constitutional framework also vested local government with a great deal of 
decentralisation. South Africa historically had a centralist form of government with provincial 
governments controlling the scope of local government through provincial ordinances that defi ned 
their functions and powers. Local government legislation also had to be approved by provinces. 
This changed quite substantially under the fi nal system of local government. Theoretically, 
the new Constitution uplifted local government from a subordinate level of government to a 
signifi cant sphere with original powers in its own right. Provision was no longer made for levels of 
government. Instead, a three-sphere system of government was introduced in which the spheres 
are distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, with the principle of co-operative government 
underpinning intergovernmental relations (Cameron 2001; Pimstone 1998).
The Constitution, 1996 states that a municipality has the right to govern, on its own 
initiative, the local government affairs of the community, subject to the national and provincial 
legislation as provided for in the Constitution. Municipalities now have constitutionally 
guaranteed functions.
Although national government and provincial government may regulate local government, 
this must be done in a way that does not compromise its ability or right to govern (Cameron 
2001; Pimstone 1998; Yacoob 1996).
Creation of Category A metropolitan municipalities
The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 showed a clear preference for a single-tier 
system of metropolitan government. The goals of the White Paper were embodied in 
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legislation in the form of the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, which was passed 
in December 1998.
The most important change was the replacement of the two-tier metropolitan system 
with Category A authorities. Section 2 of the Act states that:
An area must have a single Category A municipality if that area can reasonably be 
regarded as:
 ● a conurbation featuring :-
 ● areas of high population density;
 ● an intensive movement of people, goods, and services;
 ● extensive development; and
 ● multiple business districts and industrial areas.
 ● a centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy;
 ● a single area for which integrated development is desirable; and
 ● having strong interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent 
units.
This defi nition is a description of metropolitan areas, which means that category A 
municipalities would be introduced in such areas only. The experience of the two-tier 
system had not been a happy one, particularly in Johannesburg where it contributed to a 
lack of clarity between functions, powers and fi nance, which, in turn, led to serious fi nancial 
problems (Cameron 1999).
Metropolitan municipalities had the option of creating sub-councils or ward committees. 
Sub-councils consist of ward councillors representing the ward, along with some proportional 
representation councillors. Ward committees consist of the councillor of the ward and up 
to ten representatives of civil society. Neither structure has inherent powers nor depend 
on delegation from metros. The difference between the two bodies is that sub-councils are 
primarily intended to be decentralised administrations, while ward committees are intended 
to be a vehicle to promote local democracy and participation (Cameron 2000).
Metropolitan government reorganisation 1999/2000
The Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB) was entrusted with the authority to demarcate 
local government boundaries in the country. It undertook a study in 1999 of metropolitan 
areas and large Transitional Local Councils (TLCS, which were non-metropolitan local 
government structures), with the aim of evaluating them against the criteria in the Local 
Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 for determining metropolitan areas in 
legislation (Municipal Demarcation Board 1999). The urban conurbations working group 
was set up by the MDB to examine possible metropolitan options. This committee examined 
Statistics SA data, most notably the 1996 census and household surveys, and also considered 
submissions from stakeholders.
Based on its research, the MDB created six single-tier metropolitan authorities:
 ● Greater Johannesburg
 ● Greater Durban (now called eThekwini)
 ● Greater Cape Town
 ● Greater Pretoria (now called Tshwane)
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 ● East Rand (now called Ekurhuleni)
 ● Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage-Despatch (now called Nelson Mandela Bay) (Cameron 
2000).
Single-tier metropolitan government system and service delivery
There have been some studies considering the performance of metropolitan government in 
South Africa (Cameron 2000, 2005, Pieterse 2002, MCA Planners and Oranje 2005).
MCA Planners and Oranje (2005:14) concluded that the (single-tier) metro was the 
right scale at which interventions in the South African cityscape could be made, and that 
it made it possible to plan for metropolitan transportation and land development in a co-
ordinated and integrated way. The single-tier model was a far better vehicle for integrated 
land-use, transport and infrastructure investment than the two-tier system which had hitherto 
existed. The South African Cities Network (2007:92) stated that the creation of single-tier 
municipalities with widely drawn boundaries encompassing whole cities has promoted the 
scope for even more effective urban management.
Virtually all interviewees supported the widely-drawn single-tier metropolitan authority 
boundaries created by the MDB. This came out strongly in the Johannesburg, Tshwane and 
Nelson Mandela Bay interviews. While there was a debate precisely where the boundaries 
should be, all agreed that the MDB largely succeeded with the delimitation.
The interviewees indicated that the single-tier system has led to the embodiment of the 
one city, one tax base slogan and the inclusion of the poor into the city. It was argued that 
metro government works because there is a single integrated budget where funds can be 
raised in wealthy areas and redistributed to poor areas. There are no longer the apartheid 
boundaries and the status quo should be maintained. It was argued that the notion that the 
metros are too large and should be divided into smaller areas should be rejected. There had 
also been the move away from the dysfunctional two-tier system which, as pointed out, had 
led not only to the ineffi cient division of functions and powers but also contributed to the 
virtual bankruptcy of Johannesburg due to the misallocation of fi nancial resources between 
the two tiers of government.
The South African Cities Network (2007:92) points out that while widely drawn municipal 
boundaries have enabled much better city government, there remain key instances where 
the urban area extends across city boundaries. This occurs most signifi cantly in Gauteng, 
where three metropolitan councils adjoin one another. Although of lesser signifi cance, it is 
also a feature of the eThwekwini-Msunduzi area.
Five of the metros have identifi able dominant administrations within which most 
reorganisation took place. The exception has been Ekurhuleni, which consisted of 
approximately 11 medium-sized municipalities, making the creation of a single metropolitan 
municipality with a single, integrated administration particularly challenging (South African 
Cities Network 2006:67).
The concern about the lack of integration in Ekurhuleni was raised in the interviews, but 
there was consensus that changing structures now would set the metropolitan authority back 
even further.
Most interviewees agreed that single-tier metros had led to signifi cant service 
improvement. This was borne out in the service delivery statistics in Table no1.
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Table 1 explains access to the four main services, namely water, electricity, refuse collection 
and fl ush toilets. It then averages access across the four services. It can be seen that in two 
municipalities (Cape Town and Johannesburg) the average access of services is over 90% 
while it is over 80% in the other four metros.
This data from SALGA in Table 2 includes what were then aspirant metros (Mangaung, 
Mzunduzi and Buffalo City) into its metro category. Nevertheless it does not detract from the 
fact that the service backlogs in metros are considerably lower than in secondary cities and 
rural municipalities. This is partly due to the fact that the metros are considerably wealthier 
than non-metros with much higher Geographical Value Added (GVA-a measure of municipal 
activity in the local sphere).
Furthermore, metros have the resources to pay more than the minimum level for free 
services. It has been government policy since December 2000 that municipalities provide 
six kilolitres of water and 50 kilowatts of electricity free to each household monthly. Most 
municipalities are providing free services in one form or another. Most provide free services 
to all residents but some offer them to indigents only (Portfolio Committee on Provincial 
and Local Government 2003). Some municipalities provide more than the minimum 
requirements. For example, Tshwane provides 100 kilowatts of free electricity, Nelson 













City of Cape Town 98,73 81,3 95,49 92,77 92,07
Ekurhuleni 98,36 67,4 88,89 69,71 81,09
eThekwini 94,89 74,41 86,21 85,03 85,14
City of Johannesburg 97,03 80,19 93,93 89,44 90,15
Nelson Mandela Bay 98,65 64,84 89,64 87,57 85,18
City of Tshwane 95,3 74,21 80,81 73,05 80,84
Source Statistics South Africa, 2007.
Table 2 Socio-economic differentiating factors
Criteria 
Large and aspirant 
metropolitan cities 




Average GVA per capita R39 686 R22 854 R4 184
Formalised households 79% 55% 8% 
Households no water 2% 8% 34% 
Households no sanitation 13% 29% 69% 
Households no electricity 21% 25% 45% 
Source SALGA, 2010.
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Mandela Bay provides eight kilolitres of water and 75 kilowatts of electricity, Ekurhuleni 
provides nine kilolitres of water to indigents and 100 kilowatts of electricity and eThekwini 
provides nine kilolitres of water and 65 kilowatts of electricity.
Despite these service delivery improvements, there are still high levels of backlogs. MCA 
Planners and Oranje (2005:12) state that despite service delivery improvements, metros were 
simply not able to keep up with the high levels of in-migration and household formation. The 
high levels of growth can be seen in Table 3.
It can be deduced that there has been growth in most urban areas between both 1996 and 
2001 and between 2001 and 2007. If one examines the 2001 to 2007 data in metropolitan 
areas one can deduce that the growth rates vary from 4, 49% in Nelson Mandela Bay to 
20, 87% in Cape Town. This population growth has implications for service delivery and 
population growth.
What are the reasons for this urban growth? The South African Cities Network (2004 
and 2006) states that migration accounts for most of the city growth. However, some of this 
migration is circular migration, where members of rural households move to cities to fi nd 
work, while maintaining contacts with rural areas. City to city migration also occurs.
The City of Cape Town (2009A:13) states that housing, population growth and associated 
infrastructure backlogs can be ascribed to the increasing infl ux of people into the city. 
Rapid growth has placed tremendous strain on current infrastructure (which is most acutely 
experienced in water, waste removal, electricity, roads and storm water services), and has 
necessitated the provision of new infrastructure. This in turn has put strain on the city’s 
fi nances.
High levels of capital investment are required to eradicate infrastructure backlogs in 
Nelson Mandela Bay (Nelson Mandela Bay 2009A:211). Typical of large metros in South 
Africa, migration into the municipal area is a key challenge in terms of service provision. 
The average annual population growth rates of both Ekurhuleni and Johannesburg are higher 
than the national average and that of the other metropolitan municipalities. The housing 
backlog remains a challenge for both the Gauteng Provincial Government, which retains 





































































Johannesburg 2 639 110 3 225 812 3 888 180 22,23 20,53 42,76
Tshwane 1 682 701 1 983 983 2 345 908 17,9 18,24 36,14
Cape Town 2 563 612 2 893 246 3 497 097 12,86 20,87 33,73
Ekurhuleni 2 026 807 2 480 277 2 724 229 22,37 9,84 32,21
eThekwini 2 751 193 3 090 121 3 468 086 12,32 12,23 24,55
Nelson Mandela Bay 969 771 1 005 778 1 050 930 3,71 4,49 8,2
Source Statistics South Africa 2007.
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the responsibility for housing provisions to lower-income segments of the population, and 
for municipalities, which have to provide necessary infrastructure, such as roads, water, 
sewerage, electricity and urban cleaning (Moodys 2009).
Representation and governance
Executive systems
The White Paper on Local Government, 1998 indicates a clear preference for a stronger 
executive, in line with global trends in many countries. Legislation, in the form of the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 embodies this goal of stronger executives.
The two types of executive systems available to metropolitan authorities are:
 ● The collective executive system, which allows for the exercise of executive authority 
through an executive committee in which the executive leadership of the municipality 
is collectively vested. Provision is made for a mayor, although he/she is only one 
member of the collective executive.
 ● The mayoral executive system, which allows for the exercise of executive authority 
through an executive mayor, in whom the leadership of the municipality is vested and 
whom a mayoral committee assists.
The collective executive must be composed in such a way that the parties represented on 
the municipal council are represented in the executive committee in substantially the same 
proportion that they are represented in council.
Under the mayoral executive system, the mayor may appoint a mayoral committee to 
provide assistance. He/she may delegate specifi c responsibilities to the mayoral committee. 
The mayor is, however, under no obligation to appoint this committee on a proportional 
basis. The idea was that this would be a cabinet-type structure, with the mayor being free to 
choose the committee members.
Both forms of executives have similar types of powers, which are cabinet-type functions 
and include the right to determine service delivery strategies and oversee service delivery, 
and the right to monitor and review. Provision is also made for the delegation of powers 
of councils to these structures. The provincial minister of local government decides on the 
type of local government structure. Most of the African National Congress (ANC)-controlled 
provincial governments chose the executive mayor system, while the (then) two opposition-
controlled provinces, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape chose the collective executive 
system. This meant that Johannesburg, Tshwane, Ekurhuleni and Nelson Mandela Bay metros 
have mayoral executive systems (Cameron 2005).
There are two provinces that are politically competitive in the local government sphere. 
The KwaZulu-Natal provincial government has adopted the collective executive system. This 
was put together when there was an ANC/Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) coalition running 
the Province and although the ANC has an absolute majority, this system has continued. 
Given the political dynamics of the province it was felt it was inopportune to allow executive 
mayoral committees, which is a winner takes all system.
In the Western Cape the DA (Democratic Alliance) opted for a collective executive 
system. When the ANC (initially in alliance with the New National Party { NNP}) took 
control of the Province from the DA in 2002, it changed to a mayoral executive system. This 
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system was retained by the DA-spearheaded multi-party coalition after it regained control of 
the Province after the 2006 local government elections (Cameron 2005).
Mayors are not elected directly in South Africa. The major parties nominate their mayoral 
candidates before elections and the respective victorious party simply elects its mayor 
(whether it is of the executive or non-executive type) at the fi rst council meeting. In practice, 
executive mayors have assumed extraordinary powers. In terms of the Constitution, 1996 
all powers can be delegated to them by councils, except the passing of by-laws, approval 
of budgets and the raising of taxes, levies, duties and the raising of loans. All metropolitan 
councils with mayoral executive committees have delegated signifi cant powers to 
these committees.
Research has revealed that delegations to mayoral executive committees were viewed by 
some as a positive step. Councillors are playing a far more active role in local government 
than was previously the case. This has reduced the disproportionate policy-making powers 
that offi cials previously enjoyed. Another advantage is that of speedier decision making. 
Executive councillors, whether through the mayoral executive system or the collective 
executive system, are now able to make decisions more quickly. Managers do not have 
to wait for council resolutions to make decisions, a defi nite benefi t in those municipalities 
where meetings are only held every two to three months (Cameron 2005).
There are, however, concerns that executive mayoral committees are becoming a 
law unto themselves. This is refl ected in the gaps that are developing between mayoral 
committee members and ordinary councillors. Atkinson (2004:135) points out that decision-
making power is effectively centralised at executive level. It has led to ordinary councillors 
and offi cials being disempowered and lacking effective powers to infl uence decision making. 
The combination of centralisation in both the executive mayoral committee system and at 
the executive level, and an inability/reluctance to agree on sound political and administrative 
delegations, has resulted in bottlenecks and a lack of transparency in decision making. 
Council meetings serve as caucus-driven rubber stamps for decisions taken by mayoral 
committee members. This concern was also raised in several interviews.
In the Western Cape, which is the most tightly contested province, the executive 
mayoral system has contributed to great instability in a number of areas, including the City 
of Cape Town. Constantly changing coalitions have led to both political and administrative 
instability. The suggestion by the Western Cape Provincial Government is that the current 
mayoral executive system should be reviewed in order to explore the more inclusive plenary, 
proportional and collective system (Western Cape Provincial Government 2009).
In an interview the then manager of Nelson Mandela Bay supported the mayoral 
executive system. He said that delegating power to mayoral committees led to speedier 
decision making. However, there needed to be a clear distinction between the executive and 
legislature so that the latter can perform oversight over the former.
Representation
In terms of the local government electoral system 50% of councillors are elected on a ward 
basis and 50% on a proportional representation (PR) basis. It can be deduced that the metros 
have large numbers of councillors in particular, Johannesburg, Cape Town and eThekwini 
who have over 200 councillors.
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The mayoral committees are much smaller with the biggest being Johannesburg with 13. This 
has created governance problems which has already alluded to and will be discussed later 
in this section.
The Western Cape Local Government Assessment found that there was a perception 
among communities in Cape Town that ward councillors do not communicate with them 
adequately (Western Cape Provincial Government 2009:19). This concern was also raised 
by provincial and local government interviewees in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western 
Cape, as well as by a senior Treasury offi cial.
The problem that non-mayoral committee councillors face, is that they do not have 
delegated powers and functions, even though they have constituencies to which they are 
accountable. One study showed how ward councillors, in turn, complain that they lack the 
powers to articulate the needs of poorer communities and to get municipal offi cials to take 
up issues on the part of the poor (Hemson 2006).
In the City of Johannesburg (2009A) councillors are consistently frustrated because of 
a lack of information on both planned service delivery – for example, grass cutting, road 
resurfacing, tree cutting, major maintenance, initiation of capital projects, deviations from 
planned delivery – and planned service delivery disruption.
What is problematic in terms of governance is the local government electoral system. 
As already alluded to, 50% of councillors are elected on a ward basis and 50% on a 
proportional representation (PR) basis. The local party list PR/ward system has centralised 
powers in the hands of party leaders. Mayors and councillors owe their positions to the party 
leaders who put them on the list rather than to those who voted for them. Councillors cannot 
defect without losing their seats (fl oor-crossing arrangements have just been abolished, after 
allowing councillors to defect under highly circumscribed arrangements). A study (Cameron 
2003) has shown that the ANC (in Ekurhuleni) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) (in Cape 
Town) have both removed mayors of metropolitan governments. Accountability is to political 
leaders rather than to communities.
The concern about the electoral system was expressed by senior City of Johannesburg 
offi cials who stated that it has led to huge, bloated councils. There are a number of PR 
councillors who only attend one council meeting and do little else regarding their 
representative duties. Consideration should be given to changing the electoral formula to 
increase the number of ward councillors and reduce the number of PR councillors. Having 
Table 4 Wards and Councillors (2006–2011)
Municipality Number of wards Number of councillors
Johannesburg 109 217




Nelson Mandela Bay 60 120
Source Independent Electoral Commission 2006.
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more ward councillors could potentially increase the quality of democratic representation. 
This issue was also raised by other interviewees.
A concern raised by an interviewee about the electoral system was the constant changing 
of PR councillors by party leaders. People who are previous members of the national 
legislature have ended up as members of mayoral committees halfway through local 
government terms, despite not having any local government experience. The electorate 
voted on the basis of who was on the PR list. He stated that one cannot have a list at the end 
of the fi ve years that looks completely different to the one for which voters cast their votes.
Ward committees
Sub-councils and ward committees have been created to promote public participation in 
South Africa. The choice of sub-councils or ward committees was a provincial responsibility. 
The ANC-controlled province in Gauteng opted for ward committees after the 2000 local 
government elections. In eThekwini, neither sub-councils nor ward committees were created 
until the 2006 local government elections. Ward committees have subsequently been created 
in this metro. Sub-councils were created in DA-controlled Cape Town. These structures will 
be discussed later in this article.
A ward committee consists of the councillor representing that ward in the council, 
who must also be the chairperson of the committee, and not more than 10 other persons. 
Provision is made for a diversity of interests to be represented, which normally takes the form 
of sectoral representation.
The South African Cities Network (2006:4-59) points out that the effectiveness of ward 
committees in big cities has been variable, with indications being that many have been 
ineffective or dysfunctional. There are concerns that they lack functions and powers.
In eThekwini there is concern regarding the effectiveness of ward committees. Some 
committees report that they seldom meet, if ever. They maintain that there is little support 
for them regarding offi ce space and equipment. The lack of fi nancial support to offset the 
expenses that they personally incur and the lack of training have also been mentioned as 
hindrances. The lack of communication between councillors and committees has led in 
some instances to committees becoming dysfunctional. (eThekwini 2009:137–138).
Nelson Mandela Bay (2009A:85) points out that it introduced the ward-based planning 
process in 2007/8, in terms of which members of the community are trained as co-ordinators 
in identifying ward priorities. These are subsequently fed into the IDP (Integrated and 
Development Plan) and budgeting processes for implementation.
In terms of the municipality’s evaluation of ward committees (Nelson Mandela Bay 2009B) 
they seem to be working relatively well in historically white wards. Lack of meaningful 
public participation on the municipal budget and IDPs was raised as an issue in a number 
of the historically black wards. When it came to service delivery, lack of communication 
and poor response time between ward committees and municipal offi cials was also raised 
as an issue in disadvantaged areas. An interview with a senior offi cial in Nelson Mandela 
Bay, however, revealed that ward committees were not working particularly well. He stated 
that the problem was that they were too politicised and operated as branches of the ANC. 
Members were deployed to ward committees and membership of ward committees was a 
stepping stone to becoming a councillor.
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This view that many ward committee members harbour political aspirations, seeking 
ultimately to become councillors themselves, was corroborated by another study (Buccus 
and Hicks 2008). The authors state that ward committee members compete with councillors, 
politicise development and sometimes wilfully mislead community members, making 
allegations about corruption and fuelling service delivery riots.
In the City of Tshwane there were also differences between how ward committees 
worked in historically white areas and black areas. In the former there is a high level of 
input from previously advantaged areas whereas in the latter, ward committees were used 
to develop an alternate centre of power. Councillors are set up for failure. There is a tension 
between councillors and ward committees. There are people who feel they are left out of the 
deployment process who want power (interview with senior City of Tshwane offi cial 2009).
Sub-councils
Sub-councils were created in DA-controlled Cape Town in 2001. After the DA Coalition won 
control of the city from the ANC in 2006, it increased the number of sub-councils to 23. It 
replaced ward committees with ward forums. Sub-councils consist of a logical grouping of 
wards. Cape Town has 105 wards, so sub-councils typically consist of four to fi ve wards. 
Sub-councils fall under the political control of speakers of council.
Sub-councils can be chosen on a sector basis, geographical basis or a combination 
thereof. A sub-council may make recommendations to the council on any matter affecting 
its area. A sub-council has such powers and duties as the council may delegate to it and 
may advise the council on what these should be (City of Cape Town 2009B). A number 
of delegated powers were vested in sub-councils in 2007 including local town planning 
powers, land-use rezoning and usage of open spaces.
The OECD report on Cape Town (2008:285) states that the agenda of sub-councils is 
largely driven centrally by full council, and there is limited opportunity to address matters 
of concern derived from local communities. Interviews suggest this is slowly changing with 
greater delegated powers been given to sub-councils.
Sub-councils co-exist with ward forums, which fall under sub-councils and are serviced 
administratively by the sub-council’s administration. Ward forums have 20 members as 
opposed to ward committees’ 10 members. Ward forums have advisory powers only and 
can make recommendations through the ward councillor to the relevant sub-council. They 
can also monitor and report on service delivery in the ward and make input into the budget 
and IDP process.
The Western Cape Provincial Government assessment found that communities in the 
areas where interviews were conducted do not know of the existence of ward forums in 
Cape Town (Western Cape Provincial Government 2009). In fairness to the municipality, 
they are a recent creation and should be given time to establish themselves. Perhaps more 
systematic research is needed on the performance of sub-councils.
Integrated development plans
This section examines the governance implications of IDPs. Public participation is also an 
integral component of IDPs which are the fl agship development tools of municipalities. 
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An IDP must refl ect a council’s vision for the long-term development of the municipality 
with special emphasis on its most critical development and internal transformation needs. 
It is the primary focus for community involvement in policy (Pieterse 2002). The Municipal 
Systems Act, 2000 states that budgets should refl ect IDP priorities. Performance indicators 
also need to be used to measure IDP processes. All municipalities are required to draw 
up performance management systems. The intention was that fi nal IDPs should refl ect the 
development needs of the new municipality as a whole.
The City of Johannesburg (2009B) concluded that the Integrated Development Plan prior 
to 2007 was not user friendly, and communities found genuine diffi culties engaging with 
the plan. An offi cial in the Department of Local Government, Western Cape Provincial 
Government stated that the Cape Town’s IDP showed limited consultation with the 
community, which has impacted upon service delivery.
The City of Johannesburg has attempted greater alignment between IDPs and ward needs 
given that there is a signifi cant lack of information that is ward specifi c, (City of Johannesburg, 
2009A, Gauteng Provincial Government, 2009). Tshwane has indicated that community 
mobilisation is inadequate during IDP and budget consultation resulting in a minority 
contributing towards the decisions of the institution (Gauteng Provincial Government 2009). 
The City of Tshwane (2009:9) also raised concerns about public participation in the IDP 
stating that the city does not give suffi cient feedback to the communities with regards to their 
issues and problems and that it do not suffi ciently address ward level issues.
A study of public participation of the IDP in eThekwini by Ballard, Bonnin, Robinson 
and Xaba (2006) concluded that there is some form of public participation, although not 
necessarily in the form that the drafters of the legislation envisaged. The participation that 
exists is limited. At one level it is viewed as a tool for offi cials to moderate and shape 
expectations of people. However, it is also a conduit for communities to interact with 
their elected representatives and senior bureaucrats, giving them space to demand greater 
accountability. Williamson, Sithole and Todes (2006) in a study of IDPs in three municipalities 
in Kwa-Zulu Natal including eThekwini found that there were limited opportunities to 
participate. It was a careful top-down controlled process.
There is a general sense that city IDPs have been produced with very limited national 
or provincial input, despite signifi cant efforts by most cities to involve them in the process 
(South African Cities Network 2006:4-63). This was corroborated in an interview with a 
senior Nelson Mandela Bay offi cial. The OECD (2008:84) points out that public participation 
in IDPs are largely ceremonial given local government’s absence of structures to monitor and 
evaluate community participation.
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT WORKERS
In his State of the Nation address in 2003, then President Mbeki identifi ed the need for 
community development workers (CDWs). Presidential and provincial visits to communities 
had identifi ed defi ciencies in service delivery in the local government sphere and the need 
to improve the situation. CDWs were subsequently established. The CDW programme is 
being co-ordinated in the national sphere, but is managed in the provincial sphere, where 
staff are trained and redeployed to local government.
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CDWs are intended to assist ward councillors and their interface with the community 
they serve, while ensuring that the ward councillors can have the necessary response from 
the municipal administration. It is an attempt to allow national and provincial government 
to play a bigger role in assisting municipalities with delivering services to communities. 
CDWs operate within a system of local government in which local leaders, primarily ward 
councillors and ward committees, play an important role (Levin 2009).
COGTA (2009:14-15) states that there is often an unhappy relationship between CDWs 
and councillors, with the former often acting as laws unto themselves. CDWs do, however, 
have some benefi ts. For example they support the Thusong centres as one-stop shops for 
government services.
In Tshwane there are 88 CDWs for 62 wards. CDWs are invited to monthly ward 
committee meetings and are given the opportunity to assist ward committee members in 
resolving community problems/queries raised in public meetings. Most CDWs conduct door-
to-door work on government services, e.g. identifi cation documents and grants. The level 
of impact of the door-to-door work varies from one ward to another (Gauteng Provincial 
Government 2009).
The Gauteng Provincial Government (2009) stated that the informal relationship 
between councillors and CDWs in Johannesburg is often excellent and many CDWs work 
out of councillors’ decentralised work environments. However, interviews picked up more 
uneasiness in the relationship between councillors and CDWs. For example, there was a 
view from a senior Johannesburg offi cial that CDWs should be abolished. They are employed 
by the province and are often at odds with ward councillors. The offi cial felt that the huge 
amounts of money that have been spent on CDWs should have been spent on supporting 
ward councillors. If councillors can play a role in communicating community concerns into 
a ward plan and then communicate the plan with the community, this would be a better use 
of resources. It was pointed out that CDWs are often in competition with ward councillors. 
CDWs are at an advantage as they work full time whereas councillors work part-time.
CONCLUSION
Documentation and interviews suggest that the creation of single-tier widely drawn 
boundaries encompassing the whole city is a better instrument for integrated land-use, 
transport and infrastructure investment than the previous two-tier system. It has led to the 
embodiment of the one city, one tax base slogan. It has also contributed to improved service 
delivery although there are still backlogs due to in-migration.
While there are some advantages to the mayoral executive system, such as speedier 
decision making, there are concerns that it has led to a lack of transparency in decision 
making.
There is evidence to suggest that ordinary councillors do not communicate effectively 
with their constituencies. Part of the problem is that they do not have delegated powers and 
functions, even though they have constituencies to which they are accountable. While some 
ward committees are functioning, the evidence suggests that the majority are not working 
particularly well. They are too politicised and do not appear to promote public participation. 
Ironically enough they seem to work better in historical white wards.
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CDWs do bring some benefi ts to metropolitan municipalities and support councillors 
in some instances. However, there is some concern about their relationship with elected 
councillors and the implications of this for democratic accountability.
While metropolitan governments are working relatively well in comparison with non-
metropolitan municipalities there is clearly room for improvement. A senior offi cial in the 
National Treasury stated that there was a correlation between the length of stay of the 
mayor and municipal manager in their jobs, and the performance of municipalities: the 
longer that people are in their positions, the better they perform. This view was shared 
by some interviewees. At the time of fi eld research in 2009, two of the six metropolitan 
councils had acting municipal managers. The manager of Nelson Mandela Bay was on 
long leave and the municipal manager of Tshwane was suspended. The mayor and entire 
mayoral committee of Nelson Mandela Bay was removed by the ANC regional political 
leaders in 2009.
The biggest complaint from the metro governments was that they are shackled by a 
plethora of national and provincial legislation including the Local Government: Municipal 
Financial Management Act, 2003 (MFMA) and planning regulations. Interviewees were 
virtually unanimous that regulations that treat all municipalities the same hinder service 
delivery and that there should be a differentiation of powers and functions between city/
metros and other local governments.
In conclusion, there is a need to remove unnecessary controls over metropolitan 
government. There should be a move away from a one-size-fi ts-all approach to local 
government towards a differentiation of powers and functions between city/metros and other 
local governments.
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